The Front Line

The fly goes where the wound is.

Mexico's animal-health service publishes, in a fortnightly bulletin almost nobody outside Mexico reads, a table of where on the animal the maggots were found. Twenty-one rows. It is the single most useful document in this entire outbreak, because it turns an epidemic into a checklist a rancher can actually work from.

Sixteen thousand four hundred and eighty-nine. It is a cumulative figure — every case since the first one, not a snapshot of today. Hold that word. It is the whole discipline of this tab, and it is where this lab's ninth error lived.

SENASICA gives that number three different ways: by wound location, by species, and by state. Three tables, three completely different cuts of the same outbreak. All three sum to exactly 16,489 — checked to the unit, by hand, for this rebuild. 🔵 the three sums are this lab's check That is what a real dataset does, and it is why you can trust the shape of it.

Every bar above is a verbatim figure from AVANCE 11: wound table p.7, species table p.2, state table p.6. (This page cited the state table to “pp.6–7” for three versions. All twenty state rows are on p.6; p.7 is the wound table. Corrected.) 🟢 sourced, all three tables Nothing here is interpolated, smoothed, or modelled. The only thing this lab added is the arithmetic, and the arithmetic is on screen.

Fourteen hundred of them are wounds we made on purpose.

Read down the wound table and four rows are not accidents. Aretado (ear-tagging) 546 · descorne (dehorning) 474 · marcaje (branding) 204 · castración (castration) 132. Total: 1,356. 🔵 derived — the four rows are SENASICA's; the sum is this lab's

Those are husbandry. They are things a person did to an animal with a tool, on a day they chose, in a place they chose. Which means they are the part of this outbreak that is schedulable — the one column where the answer is not “more flies.”

What the plan actually prescribes, and it is only the second half of that: “polvo curativo (sobre con 5 gramos de coumafos al 5%) y dar una segunda aplicación al tercer día” — curative dust, 5 g of 5% coumaphos, second application on the third day. Treat the wound. 🟢 Plan de Emergencia GBG (SENASICA/DGSA/CPA, 2024) — verbatim

The other half — “not in fly season” — is this page's, and it was flying Mexico's flag. Until this correction the page wrote “not in fly season, and treat the wound when you do — Mexico's own emergency plan says so,” under a single 🟢. The plan does not say so. It was searched for época, temporada and estacional and it contains no seasonal-scheduling guidance of any kind. The 🟢 covered the powder. It never covered the calendar. Timing husbandry away from peak fly activity is a sensible inference and it may well be good advice — but it is not in the document, so it does not get the document's flag. ⚪ “not in fly season” — this lab's inference; no source in this lab's folder states it

Three wild animals. In sixteen thousand cases.

Of 16,489 confirmed cases, SENASICA records 3 in fauna silvestre — wildlife — and 1 in a lagomorph. Four. 🟢 AVANCE 11 species table

Nobody believes there are only three infested wild animals in Mexico. What that row measures is not wildlife infestation. It measures surveillance — and surveillance is a rancher noticing a wound on an animal he owns. Nobody owns a deer. The number is a detection artifact, and it is the loudest silence in the dataset. 🔵 this reading is the lab's comment, clearly labelled as comment — SENASICA says only what the count is

The 2016–17 Florida Keys outbreak is the counter-test: the one time the United States actually got an established infestation, it was found in a deer — a ciervo de los cayos, Odocoileus virginianus clavium, on Big Pine Key — because somebody was counting deer. 🟢 206212 (22pp), pp.7–8 · sourced for this correction — see Tab I

The “active case” series is gone, and it is not coming back.

What replaces it: two cumulative points, both federal, both quotable — and not in the same unit

Two points, from two bulletins, from the same agency — and this page is no longer entitled to say they are in the same unit. They are both cumulative, which is the discipline that matters here and the reason the active-case series had to go. But one of them counts people and the other does not, and that is stated in the same breath as the number, where it belongs.

And a majority of the human cases cannot be explained by animals.

The human myiasis figures do not come from SENASICA. They come from the Secretaría de Salud, Dirección General de Epidemiología, in a monthly bulletin with a different denominator and a different cut-off. Two agencies, two systems. This lab spent three rounds mixing them up.

Two things this lab used to print here, and no longer does. ⚪ “Cumulative to Mar 20, 2026 — 204” — the bulletin's nearest figure is 229, across 12 states. A near-miss is not a source. ⚪ “295 YTD by Jun 16” and “Veracruz 69” — each Salud bulletin prints its own cut-off on every table, and they are two different dates: Informe No. 2 prints “fecha de corte 01 de febrero”; Informe No. 4 prints “fecha de corte 04 de abril de 2026.” The later of the two is April. An April document cannot source a June row. Both figures are withdrawn. 🟢 both cut-offs read off the tables, this correction — and until this correction this page asserted that both bulletins said April. One says February. That false quotation is logged in the audit trail.

No government has published a required weekly figure for this front. The literature has — and it is a tenth of what this page once drew.

The way to fight this fly is to flood the sky with sterilised males. Females mate once in a lifetime; if she mates with a sterile male, her eggs never hatch. It is a brilliant technique and it works. It has one input: flies. So the obvious question — the one every version of this lab has tried to answer — is: how many flies a week does it take?

No government in this corpus has said. Not USDA, in its facility register or in four pages of signed correspondence from its Chief Scientist. Not COPEG, in its own institutional history. Not SENASICA, in fourteen months of fortnightly bulletins. Not even Mexico's national emergency plan for this exact pest — a document whose entire purpose is to state what the country will need. Every sterile-fly figure any government publishes here is a capacity or a release rate.

But the corpus is not empty of requirements, and this page said it was. “There is not one requirement in it” stood in this spine for three versions. It is false, and it is disproved by a paper this page already cites, quotes twice, and stands on.

That is a requirement. In insects. Per week. Costed, and published. And it carries its own caveats, which ride with it and are not optional: it is not a government figure — it is a 2016 peer-reviewed cost model, not a federal demand. And it is costed for the wrong country — it prices the production needed at COPEG to eradicate the screwworm from Cuba, not to hold the Darién barrier, not for Mexico, and not for Texas. 🟡 2016 cost model · scoped to a Cuba campaign · not a present-day federal requirement for this front

It is not a target and it does not go on the chart. It is printed here as a fact with its provenance, because it exists and this page said nothing like it existed. Turning it into a new red line would be the same crime as the last red line, committed by a lab that had just apologised for it.

Read what it actually says — and read the conjunction. Mexico's federal emergency plan for the screwworm, written in 2024, before the first case, says the quantity of sterile pupae it will request depends on two things: the needs of the Campaign in Mexico and the production capacity of the Panama plant. Need and capacity. Both. That is what the Spanish says, and this page is not entitled to half of it.

The true claim is smaller, and it is enough: the plan acknowledges a need and then never names a number for it. No quantity, no timeline, no budget. It is a document that says the requirement exists and declines, in the same sentence, to state it.

The capacity ledger.

Production means rearing, sterilising and making flies. Dispersal means receiving sterile pupae, hatching them, and dropping them out of an aeroplane. A dispersal facility makes no flies at all. USDA keeps two separate registers, and confusing them has broken this page more than once — so every row below is labelled with which of the two it is, and the interactive will not let them add together.

Mexico built a 500-million-a-week plant. In 1976.

It is a real sentence in a real federal document and it is this lab's best line. It is also a capacity rating for one plant in 1976 — a nameplate, not a need. The same paragraph rates it in “moscas estériles” (sterile flies) while describing it as a plant for “adultos machos estériles” (sterile adult males). The single most quoted sentence in this lab mixes the two units in one breath. Nobody gets to cash it as a target.

And two things about that plant that cut against this lab

The chain, sourced end to end: Mission, Texas closed January 1981 and “las acciones de la planta de Chiapas, remplazaron las de la antigua planta de Misión, Texas” — Chiapas replaced Mission. 🟢 206212 p.5 Then Pacora replaced Chiapas in 2006. 🟢 206212 p.6 Three plants, one at a time, each one further from the United States than the last. That is the whole institutional history of North American sterile-fly production, and it is a story about consolidation, not about capacity.

What was actually being made, when the barrier broke.

🟢 COPEG 2024 programme infographic Pupae produced and flies released are different numbers, and COPEG keeps them apart. So does this lab, now. 🔵 806,748,143 ÷ 212 flights ≈ 3.8 million flies per flight — that division is this lab's

And the number that reframes the whole question: Concha et al. (2016), working inside the COPEG facility, costed the plant's routine barrier work at 16 million sterile insects a week.

Represented at the paper's own confidence, and no higher. It is a sentence about what it cost to produce 16 million insects for regular operations — not a statement that the barrier was held with 16 million flies a week, and not a claim that anything caused anything.

The same paper, on the same page, gives the facility's ceiling. Here is what it actually says, and it is worth reading against what this page used to put in quotation marks:

The arithmetic between 16M and 100M is inviting. This lab has been burned by inviting arithmetic and will not do it here. The paper is from 2016. The barrier broke in 2022. Six years is a long time, and the paper does not connect them. Neither will we.

NovoFly.

USDA's Agricultural Research Service has a new strain. It is not a gene drive. It is a male-only strain — the same lever Concha et al. described in 2016, when they modelled a fourfold reduction in the required release from a male-only line. That fourfold is a modelled figure and the paper says so itself: its calculations are “hypothetical and based on the behavior of the transgenic sexing strains in the laboratory.” 🟡 Concha 2016 — the paper's own hedge, and it travels with the number. It is not multiplied into any total on this page.

Three things this lab used to get wrong about it, all now corrected from USDA's own letter: it is not a gene drive. The “doubling” is USDA's own word, not this lab's assumption. And USDA names no EPA gate for it anywhere in four pages — while discussing EPA at length for a different product. The gate USDA names is “once production conversion specifications are finalized,” and it gives no date for that either.

The line the fly ignores is the line the cattle can't cross.

In December 2024 — a fortnight after the first Mexican case — APHIS and SENASICA signed a nine-page bilingual protocol. It is the most consequential document in this entire story and almost nobody has read it. It is the reason the border closes. Every closure you have seen in the news since is not a decision somebody made. It is a contract executing.

Source for this entire tab: APHIS-SENASICA New World Screwworm Protocol for the Importation of Ruminants from Mexico to the United States · APHIS + SENASICA, bilateral, fully bilingual, 9 pp., December 2024. Every term below was checked against the document for this rebuild. 🟢 sourced throughout

§2 — Reopening is graduated, and it is two-tier

Imports resume “in accordance with existing APHIS requirements for importation of ruminants from screwworm-affected regions (9 CFR 93.405).” And not everywhere at once:

§3 — What has to happen to one cow

§3.b–c — And when a facility does find one: the clock is the fly's

§3.a.vii — The sentence that shuts a country

One veterinarian forges one certificate, and every cow in Mexico stops moving north. Not that veterinarian's herd. Not that state. All cattle exports from Mexico. It is the single most extraordinary sentence in this entire corpus, it is a live clause in a signed bilateral protocol, and until this rebuild this lab did not know it existed.

Non-compliance with the record-keeping rules alone suspends export activity at a facility for “a minimum of 30 days (1 biological cycle).” And if a pre-export facility and an APHIS facility share a site, a detection at one “would result in concurrent closure” of the other. The whole document is built out of cascades.

There was a wall. It was made of flies.

The Darién Gap is the narrowest place in the Americas — a hundred-odd kilometres of jungle between Panama and Colombia with no road through it. From 1994 the United States and Panama ran a commission there, COPEG, whose entire job was to fly sterile flies over that gap, week after week, for twenty-eight years, so that the screwworm could not walk back up the isthmus.

Note what COPEG's own official history does not contain. Its dated timeline runs 1966 · 1994 · 2006 · 2023 · 2024 · 2025 — it jumps straight from 2006 to 2023. The entire barrier-maintenance era is a blank in the commission's own memory, and 2012 sits inside that blank. This lab once printed that the Chiapas plant closed “against the protests of COPEG.” ⚪ that clause rests on a single secondary source, COPEG's own history does not carry it, and it is withdrawn from the body of this page. It was the most rhetorically useful phrase here. That is exactly why it had to go.

USDA's Chief Scientist wrote it down.

On 23 June 2026 the Texas Commissioner of Agriculture wrote to Washington to say the strategy was failing. Two days later the Chief Scientist of the United States Department of Agriculture wrote back — four pages, point by point, cc'd to the Secretary of Agriculture and the White House Chief of Staff. In the middle of a letter written to disagree with a critic, he conceded this:

That is this lab's entire thesis, granted in writing by the agency the lab is arguing about. Note the framing — “as you have correctly pointed out” — USDA agreeing with a critic on the record. And note “temporary.” He concedes the limitation and insists on its impermanence in the same clause, and names no date.

He concedes it twice more, structurally:

Miller vs USDA. Show both. Resolve neither.

They agree the front is not holding. They disagree completely about why — and this lab does not get to pick, because it is not qualified to and because picking is how it got in trouble.

⚪ Miller's two numbers are Miller's. An advocacy letter from a state official is not a data source, USDA declined to confirm either figure when given the direct opportunity, and SENASICA publishes no active-case series at all (Tab II). They are printed as things he said. They are not promoted.

The barrier was saving American ranchers $1.3 billion a year.

🟢 COPEG 2024 programme infographic — “AHORROS anuales para productores: Estados Unidos $1,300,000,000” The old “$2.3B/yr” figure this page carried is withdrawn. It reconciles to nothing COPEG publishes, and its origin is unknown. It was flagged ⚪ unverified at the time and the flag did its job: the number was wrong by a billion dollars.

And a second, older, smaller federal estimate, printed because it does not flatter: the FAO figures quoted in Mexico's 2021 economic study put the annual benefit of eradication at US$796M for the United States, $292M for Mexico, $77.9M for Central America. 🔴 two sourced savings figures, two bodies, two vintages — $1.3B (COPEG, 2024) vs $796M (FAO, via 206212, p.9). We print both.

COPEG runs on 412 staff across 25 work centres — eighteen of them in the Darién — plus 160 vigilantes honorarios, unpaid volunteers who are, in COPEG's own words, “los OJOS y OÍDOS del Programa” — the eyes and ears of the programme. 🟢 COPEG 2024 A billion dollars a year of American cattle was being protected, in part, by a hundred and sixty volunteers in the Panamanian jungle.

The fly goes where the wound is.

It did not cross the border. It crossed a continent, one open wound at a time — a navel, a wire cut, an ear tag, a fight — and the only thing on that whole route that ever stopped at the Rio Grande was the paperwork. The paperwork works. It is doing exactly what it was drafted to do, and it is measured in the fly's own reproductive cycle.

What is not working is upstream of all of it, and USDA has said so in writing: there is one plant, it is in Panama, and its flies have been redeployed north. How many flies would it take to hold everything? No government has ever published the number. Not USDA, not COPEG, not SENASICA. Mexico's own emergency plan comes closest, and what it actually says is that the quantity requested will depend on the needs of the Campaign and the capacity of the Panama plant — it names the need, and then declines to put a figure on it. 🟢 Plan de Emergencia p.36

One number does exist, and this page missed it for three versions: the peer-reviewed literature costed a weekly requirement of 50 million insects — at COPEG, in 2016, to eradicate the fly from Cuba. 🟢 Concha 2016, printed p.8 of 13 🟡 a 2016 cost model, scoped to Cuba — not a requirement for this front It is a tenth of the number this page once drew on its own chart. Pacora, by itself, publishes roughly twice it.

Which is the finding, and it is not the one this lab went looking for. The requirement was never 500 million. The one requirement anybody ever costed was smaller than what a single plant already makes — and the barrier broke anyway. It was never a capacity story. This lab spent three versions building a chart against a number it invented, then a fourth version proudly deleting the chart — and all four were answering a question the record does not ask. The Chief Scientist of the United States Department of Agriculture had already conceded the argument in a letter, for free, and the letter is upstairs.

What this is, and how it got here.

This page began as a question a rancher would ask: screwworms in Texas — how did they get across? It then spent three rebuilds asking a different question, badly, and this version puts it back.

Everything below this line is the audit trail. It is not in the body of the lab, because a reader who wants to learn about the screwworm should not have to wade through my mistakes to do it. But it is not hidden either, and the closer sends you here. A lab that has been wrong twenty-one times owes you the list.

Twenty-one errors. Most ran the same way. Three invented new ways to be wrong — and two were caught, written down, and then dropped by the repair.

Errors 10–15 — found in the rebuild that was written to fix errors 1–9

The nine above were found by gates one through four. The six below were found by the fifth cold gate, reading the same documents again, after the page had already been declared repaired. Two of them are error classes this project had never seen.

Errors 16–21 — found by the sixth cold gate, and by the repair that answered it

The sixth gate read the page against the documents again. It found one defect that the fifth gate's own fix had introduced — and it found that two items on the fifth gate's own itemized fail list had never been repaired at all. They had been dropped by the repair brief that was supposed to carry them forward. They are repaired here, and the fact that they went two rounds unrepaired is itself part of the record.

Also corrected in this pass, and named because they are the same species of defect: “First Mexican case in 33 years” carried 🟢 AVANCE 04 — the bulletin gives the date, not the interval; the 33 years is this lab's subtraction from the 1991 decree and is now 🔵. · AVANCE 11's 20-state table was cited to “pp.6–7”; all twenty rows are on p.6 (p.7 is the wound table). · The Salud bulletins print no page numbers at all, so every “p.5 / p.7 / p.9” on those rows is an index claim, not a folio — every value on them was checked to the digit and every value is exact, but the reader should know the page numbers are ours. 🔵

Other things this rebuild deleted, withdrew, or downgraded

Everything this page stands on.

United States — federal, publicly linkable

• USDA APHIS — “Sterile Fly Production and Dispersal Facilities,” Screwworm.gov. Last modified 11 June 2026. The facility register: Pacora, Metapa, Moore (production); Tuxtla, Tampico, Moore (dispersal). aphis.usda.gov — the single most load-bearing document in Tab III.
• USDA APHIS — New World Screwworm US case ledger (ExportToCSV, exported 10 Jul 2026). 35 confirmed animal cases, 3 Jun – 10 Jul 2026. UTF-16, tab-separated despite the name. The whole of Tab I.
  🚩 the eight fields — and what a 🟢 on this file can and cannot certify

  The file has exactly eight named fields, and this is all of them: 1. Animal ID · 2. Confirmed Date · 3. County · 4. State · 5. Case Type · 6. Animal Type · 7. Species · 8. Status. (A ninth column exists in the export and is empty in all 35 rows.)

  There is no age field. No wound field. No outcome field. No origin field. No location finer than the county. A 🟢 citing this ledger can certify a county, a date, a species, a case type and an active/inactive status. It cannot certify anything else, and on this page it was doing exactly that.

  Two things this correction found: (1) a 🟢 “APHIS ledger, row 1” was flying over the first calf's age, its umbilical wound, and whether it survived — three facts in a file with no field for any of them. That is a verdict with no quote behind it, wearing a green flag. It is corrected in Tab I. (2) And the flag was wrong even about the row: the file is sorted newest-first, so row 1 is Crockett, 10 Jul 2026, a goat, Active. The La Pryor calf is the last row, row 35. Both gate reports that caught the first error stated that row 1 was the Zavala calf. It is not. The row number was never checked against the file — not by the page, and not by the gates. It is checked now.

• Scott H. Hutchins, Ph.D. (Under Secretary for Research, Education & Economics; USDA Chief Scientist) → Commissioner Sid Miller, 25 June 2026. 4 pp., cc: Rollins, Wiles, Schmoyer (Director, APHIS NWS Directorate). The concession, NovoFly, and USDA's side of the SWASS dispute.
• Sid Miller (Texas Commissioner of Agriculture) → Under Secretary Hutchins, 23 June 2026. 4 pp. The SWASS request; the eight-billion and 1,950 figures, both refused as sources by this lab.
• APHIS-SENASICA New World Screwworm Protocol for the Importation of Ruminants from Mexico to the United States. Bilateral, bilingual, 9 pp., December 2024. The whole of Tab IV.
• USDA APHIS, “Eradicating New World Screwworm with Sterile Insect Technique,” publication APHIS-25-031, April 2025.
• USDA APHIS, “Sterile Fly Release Methods for Controlling Screwworm,” publication APHIS-26-023, June 2026. Source of the fluorescent-dye marking of sterile pupae, and of “aerial is the default.”

Panama — COPEG

• COPEG — “History,” copeg.org/en/historia. The commission's own dated timeline: 1966 · 1994 · 2006 · 2023 · 2024 · 2025. copeg.org
• COPEG — Programa del Gusano Barrenador del Ganado, 2024 programme infographic (Spanish). Savings by country; 80M pupae/wk; 70.5M flies released/wk; 806,748,143 flies in Q1 2024 over 212 flights; 412 staff; 25 work centres; 160 vigilantes honorarios.

Peer-reviewed

• Concha, C., Palavesam, A., Guerrero, F.D., Sagel, A., Li, F., Osborne, J.A., Hernandez, Y., Pardo, T., Quintero, G., Vasquez, M., Keller, G.P., Phillips, P.L., Welch, J.B., McMillan, W.O., Skoda, S.R. & Scott, M.J. (2016). “A transgenic male-only strain of the New World screwworm for an improved control program using the sterile insect technique.” BMC Biology 14:72. doi:10.1186/s12915-016-0296-8 (Open Access). Work performed inside the COPEG biosecure facility. Source of the 16M cost-estimate sentence (printed p.7), the 100M ceiling (printed p.8), the $1.5M irradiator, and the male-only lever — a decade before NovoFly. And — found only at the fifth cold gate — the source of the only costed weekly requirement in this entire corpus: “the mass production of insects required at the COPEG facility is estimated at approximately 50 million insects per week” (printed p.8 of 13), for an eradication campaign in Cuba. Both load-bearing sentences sit in the same column of printed page 8, twelve lines apart. This page cited them to p.9 in seven places — and so did the gate report that found them, and so did the brief that commissioned the fix. Three layers, and nobody opened the PDF to the folio until the sixth gate. See error 16. 🟡 a 2016 peer-reviewed cost model, not a government requirement, and not scoped to this front — printed as a fact, refused as a target This page quoted the sentence twelve lines below it and declared that no requirement existed anywhere. See errors 10 and 11.

Mexico — federal. NOT publicly linkable: these are local PDFs.

Said plainly, because a source you cannot open is not a source you can check: the five Mexican federal documents below are files, not URLs. They were obtained as PDFs and read for this rebuild. Their titles, issuing bodies and dates are given in full so that a reader can go and find them at gob.mx/senasica or through the Secretaría de Salud's epidemiology bulletins.

• AVANCE 11 — Boletín Informativo de la CPA, Gusano Barrenador del Ganado. SENASICA / Comisión México-Americana (CPA), MARZO 2026, 40 pp., data cut 28 Feb 2026. Directorio: Berdegúé (Sec.), Calderón Elizalde (SENASICA), Ayala Borunda (DGSA), García López (CPA). The 16,489; the 21-row wound table (p.7); the species table (p.2); the 20-state table (p.6); the SE-45 peak of 517; the ~70M/wk release rate (p.35); the first Tamaulipas case. All of Tab II.
• AVANCE 04 — Boletín Informativo de la CPA, GBG. SENASICA / CPA, 15 June 2025, 9 pp. First Mexican case (Catazajá, 21 Nov 2024); 2,214 cumulative cases; SE-22 peak of 192.
• Plan de Emergencia para hacer frente a la presencia de Gusano Barrenador del Ganado. SENASICA / DGSA / CPA, Ciudad de México, 2024, 44 pp. Signed: Villalobos Arámbula, Calderón Elizalde, Gay Gutiérrez, García López. Written before the first case. Pacora at 90M/wk (p.35); Metapa as a pupae-conditioning centre (p.36); and the sentence that names both the Campaign's needs and Panama's capacity, and then puts a figure on neither (p.36). It contains no production target, no timeline and no budget. 🟡 this page misread that sentence for three versions — see error 13
• Economic-impact study of the GBG — local file sources/the files/206212.pdf, 22 pages, SADER/SENASICA-family, c. January 2021. Resumen ejecutivo · Antecedentes · Panorama internacional · Panorama nacional · Análisis del impacto socioeconómico. The 1976 Tuxtla plant (p.5); the Mission TX closure, Jan 1981 (p.5); 286,750 cases 1972–1990 (p.5); the 1991 decree (p.5); Pacora replacing Chiapas in 2006 (p.6); the treaty's end and COMEXA's DOF extinction (p.6); the 2016–17 Florida Keys outbreak, Key deer included (pp.7–8); the 2003 fertile-fly release (p.9); the FAO benefit figures (p.9).
• Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the United Mexican States Relating to the Termination of the 1972 Agreement… to Eradicate Screwworms. — local file sources/206212.pdf, 3 pages, ref. 2012–0160. Signed for the United States by Edward Avalos, Under Secretary for Marketing and Regulatory Programs, USDA. Terminates the 1972 Screwworm Agreement on 26 September 2012 and dissolves COMEXA. A treaty instrument. It independently corroborates the 26 Sep 2012 date this page prints from the economic study.
  🚩 the false correction — error 15

  TWO DIFFERENT FILES IN THIS FOLDER ARE NAMED 206212.pdf. One (3 pp.) is the treaty directly above. One (22 pp.) is the economic study directly above that. An earlier round of this project identified 206212.pdf as the termination treaty. This page declared that identification WRONG and printed the retraction as evidence of its own rigour. The earlier round was right. It was reading the other file. This page retracted a true statement, and that retraction is hereby retracted. A false correction is its own class of error — it does not flatter the argument, it flatters the corrector — and it is now on this record because it had never once occurred to us that it could happen.

• Informe mensual No. 2 · Semana epidemiológica 4 de 2026 — “Situación actual de Miasis por C. hominivorax, México.” Secretaría de Salud / Dirección General de Epidemiología, published February 2026, 15 pp. Human cases only. 25 probable / 17 confirmed (68%), p.5. Data cut-off printed on every table: “fecha de corte 01 de febrero.” 🟢 read off the tables — and it is not the April date this page twice claimed both bulletins carried. See error 12.
• Informe mensual No. 4 · Semana epidemiológica 13 de 2026. Secretaría de Salud / DGE, published April 2026, 15 pp. Data cut-off printed on every table: fecha de corte 04 de abril de 2026. 189 probable / 112 confirmed (59%), p.5; 76% hospitalised; 54% no animal contact; 72% male; Chiapas 120 of 229.

The flags, and what they mean.

If you find something wrong on this page — and the record above suggests you might — the builder wants to hear about it. The contact link is in the footer. Corrections get made, and they get credited.